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OPEN COURTS, CLOSED FILES

American lawyers recognize that the openness of the courts, and the public
nature of their proceedings and records, are hallmarks of our system ofjustice. Yet
few lawyers who represent consumers in United States courts can be unaware ofthe
national public policy debate on the frequent use and abuse of secrecy in our civil
justice system.
"Secrecy," in this debate, refers collectively to a number of legal mechanisms
that may be used to conceal litigation information from the public, from government
regulators, from attorneys handling similar cases, and in some cases even from other
courts. This information may include, but is not limited to, discovery material,
records of the results of the litigation, the legal community's own understanding of
such litigation, and sometimes even the existence of the litigation.'

* James E. Rooks Jr., is Senior Policy Research Counsel with the Center for Constitutional
Litigation, P.C., in Washington, D.C. This Article is a more detailed version of an article published in
Trial magazine: James E. Rooks Jr., Let the Sun Shine In, TRIAL, June 2003, at 18.
1. Judge Richard Posner of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has aptly described the "default
setting" of openness in the judicial system:
The general rule is that the record of ajudicial proceeding is public .... Not only
do such records often concern issues in which the public has an interest, in which

Published by Scholar Commons, 2004

1

South Carolina
Law Review, Vol. 55, Iss. 4 [2004], Art. 10 [Vol. 55: 859
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

These secrecy mechanisms include negotiated agreements or court orders to:
(1) keep the content of discovery material secret, return it to the producing party,
seal it, or destroy it; (2) keep secret one or more aspects of the case, including the
result, the amount of any compensation paid, and perhaps even the fact that the
litigation ever occurred; (3) seal court files; (4) create or alter court records to make
it difficult or impossible to tell what a case was about, to identify the parties, to
determine the disposition of a case, and in some cases to expunge from court
records all references to the case-in effect, making it "disappear" from the
courthouse; (5) vacate a previously entered judgment or other court order; and/or
(6) depublish a previously published court decision. While the means may vary
considerably, the result, and the obvious intention, are the same. In this Article, any
and all of these mechanisms are referred to by their common denominator:
"'secrecy."
There will always be instances in which confidentiality of certain aspects of
litigation is justified, or even vital, and technically speaking, these secrecy
mechanisms are usually entirely legal. However, secrecy can also lead to results
that are undesirable as a matter of public policy. Such results include instances in
which secrecy hides information that is critical to public health and safety from
government regulators and from the scientific community, removes substantial
matters of public concern from the scrutiny of the publicly funded justice system,
and multiplies the cost to parties and the court system by requiring repeated
litigation of the same factual matters. Recent real-world examples of these ill
effects of secrecy involve litigation concerning sexual abuse by clergy,2 Firestone

event concealing the records disserves the values protected by the free-speech and
free-press clauses of the First Amendment, but also the public cannot monitor

judicial performance adequately if the records ofjudicial proceedings are secret.
...These considerations, however, support a strong presumption rather than an
absolute rule. When there is a compelling interest in secrecy, as in the case of
trade secrets, the identity of informers, and the privacy of children, portions and
in extreme cases the entirety of a trial record can be sealed.... The interest in
secrecy is weighed against the competing interests case by case.
Jessup v. Luther, 277 F.3d 926, 927-28 (7th Cir. 2002) (citations omitted).
2. See, e.g., Daniel J. Wakin, Secrecy Over Abusive Priests Comes Back to Haunt Church, N.Y.

TIMES, March 12, 2002, at Al (noting that the Catholic Church's policy of secrecy over the last twenty
years is plaguing many dioceses that must admit the presence of priests accused of abuse); Michael
Paulson & Thomas Farragher, US Bishops to ProposeOustingAbusive Priests,BOSTON GLOBE, June
4, 2002, at Al (quoting U.S. CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, DRAFT CHAMBER FOR THE
PROTECTION OF CHILDREN AND YOUNG PEOPLE (June 4, 2002) (stating in Article 3 "[i]n the past,

secrecy has created an atmosphere that has inhibited the healing process, and in some cases enabled
sexually abusive behavior to be repeated. Dioceses will not enter into confidentiality agreements except
for grave and substantial reasons brought forward by the victim.")). The final version of the charter
deleted the first sentence of the article and added "and noted in the text of the agreement" at the end of
the second sentence. U.S. CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, CHARTER FOR THE PROTECTION OF
CHILDREN AND YOUNG PEOPLE (2002), availableat http://www.usccb.org/bishops/charter.htm (last
visited Apr. 2, 2004).

In an article on the initiative of the federal judges in South Carolina to ban secret settlements, The
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automobile tire failure,3 and dangerous baby products. 4 Secrecy can also be abused
through sheer excessive use-with the "exception" of secrecy swallowing the "rule"
of openness-which can degrade the public nature of the legal system and lessen
the public's confidence in it as the proper means of dispute resolution.
Any of the secrecy mechanisms described above may be proposed as an
element of a settlement agreement, and they often are.' The considerable financial
leverage of many defendants and their insurers makes a mockery of any notion that
plaintiffs' agreement to secrecy is often secured "voluntarily." For many years,
consumer lawyers have complained that ethical and moral conflicts arise when their
clients are presented with demands for secrecy during settlement negotiations.'
II.

JUDICIAL AND LEGISLATIVE EFFORTS TO DEAL WITH OVERUSE AND ABUSE OF
SECRECY

In response to the emerging understanding of the pitfalls of secret case
resolution, numerous court systems and state legislatures have sought to restrict
litigants' opportunities to keep their litigation transactions secret, either through

prohibiting some secrecy arrangements outright or by prescribing narrowly the
New York Times quoted a lawyer who had represented abuse victims in claims against the Catholic
Church in Boston: "Jeffrey A. Newman, a lawyer in Massachusetts who represents people who say they
were abused by Catholic priests.... said he regretted having participated in secret settlements in some
early abuse cases. 'It was a terrible mistake,' he said, 'and I think people were harmed by it."' Adam
Liptak, Judges Seek to Ban Secret Settlements in South Carolina,N. Y. TIMES, Sept. 2, 2002, at A1.
3. See, e.g., Richmond Eustis, Judge Orders Unsealing of Secret Firestone Documents From
Fatal 1997 Crash, FULTON COUNTY DAILY REP., Sept. 29, 2000 (reporting that data sealed under a
settlement agreement showed an unusual pattern of defects in tires manufactured at a particular
Firestone plant between 1990 and 1995; Firestone opposed a suit brought by news organizations to
unseal the data on the grounds it constituted "trade secrets"); James V. Grimaldi & Carrie Johnson,
FactoryLinked To Bad Tires, WASH. POST, Sept. 28, 2000, at E I (discussing data involving the safety
of Firestone tires that was unsealed after a lawsuit was filed by the media).
4. See, e.g., E. Maria Felcher, Safety Secrets Keep Consumers in the Dark, TRIAL, April 2001
at 40, 49 (observing that "[c]onfidential settlements have become the norm in industries like juvenile
products, where a company's financial health rests heavily on its ability to project a nurturing, caring
safety-conscious public image."). See also E. MARLA FELCHER, IT'S No ACCIDENT: How
CORPORATIONS SELL DANGEROUS BABY PRODUCTS (Common Courage Press 2001).
5. This Article does not purport to suggest to attorneys what they can and should do when and
if a settlement is offered with an attached secrecy "string." Ample advice on appropriate attorney
responses has been offered in ATLA's Trial magazine and other publications. See, e.g., James L.
Gilbert et al., Negotiation and Settlement: The Price ofSilence, TRIAL, June 1994, at 17; Francis H.
Hare, Jr. & James L. Gilbert, Products Liability: Resisting ConfidentialityOrders, TRIAL, Oct. 1990,
at 50; Frances Komoroske, Should You Keep Settlements Secret?, TRIAL, June 1999, at 55; James A.
Lowe, How To FightProtective Orders: Strategiesand Sources ofSupport, TRIAL, Apr. 1990, at 76;
Maja Ramsey et al., Keeping Secrets With Confidentiality Agreements, TRIAL, Aug. 1998, at 38.
6. The Association of Trial Lawyers of America (ATLA) long ago took a position against abuses
of secrecy in litigation. See Russ Herman, No More Dirty Secrets in the Courts, ATLA ADVOCATE,
Oct. 1989, at 4; App. A, Resolution on Protective Orders,Association of Trial Lawyers of America,
Board of Governors, May 6, 1989; SOCIETY OF PROFESSIONALJOURNALISTS & ASSOCIATION OF TRIAL
LAWYERS OF AMERICA, KEEPING SECRETS: JUSTICE ON TRIAL (Conference Report, 1990).
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circumstances under which they will be permitted. Legislative attempts along these
lines have often been unsuccessful, but efforts of the courts themselves to regulate
the process through court rules have often succeeded.7 Each year, more court
systems consider the question of whether there is too much secrecy in litigation and
what might be done about it. Judicial understanding of the problem of secrecy has
increased, and support of the news media has solidified! At least one legal ethics
board has considered secrecy-related issues.9
The approaches taken in different jurisdictions have varied, often depending on
the particular secrecy mechanism to be addressed, but their thrust is usually to
require greater judicial scrutiny of secrecy requests rather than to ban secrecy
altogether. Some examples include: declaring a presumption of openness for all
court records in the jurisdiction; limiting circumstances in which protective orders
may be entered for discovery material; requiring a showing of good cause before
approving secrecy, with the burden on the secrecy proponent; requiring public
hearings before granting secrecy orders; allowing intervention in secrecy
proceedings by interested nonparties (including news organizations or consumer
protection organizations); and specifying certain matters that may notbe kept secret.
The latest developments in this effort have been in the state court systems of

Arizona, 0 South Carolina," and the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina. 2

7. Commentators differ as to what constitutes a measure intended to restrict secrecy in litigation,
but at the present time at least the following twenty-two states have provisions that appear to be
directed toward the secrecy phenomenon: Arkansas, Arizona, California, Connecticut, Delaware,
Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, Nevada, New Jersey,
New York, North Carolina, Oregon, South Carolina, Texas, Virginia, and Washington.
8. Editorial support for recent court rule amendments directed at secrecy practices has been
strong. See Editorial, AttackingLegal Secrecy, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 29, 2002, at 10; Editorial, Don 't Keep
Public in Dark, USA TODAY, Sept. 19, 2002; Editorial, Ending Legal Secrecy, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 5,
2002, at 22; Editorial, Kudos to Judges, THE STATE (Columbia, S.C.), Aug. 5, 2002, at A6; Editorial,
Making Settlements Public,ARIZ. DAILY STAR, Nov. 18, 2002, at B4. Media organizations have joined
in lawsuits to open sealed court files or have sued on their own. See supra note 3.
9. N.Y. State Bar Ass'n, Comm. on Prof'l Ethics, Op. 730 (July 27, 2000) (finding that an
attorney may not enter into a settlement agreement that restricts the attorney's right to practice law by
prohibiting future representation of clients in cases where the attorney might use information not
protected as a confidence or secret but nevertheless is covered by terms of a settlement agreement).
10. ARIz. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(2) ("General Provisions Governing Discovery: Protective Orders")
(effective Dec. 1,2002).
11. S.C. R. Civ. P. 41.1 ("Sealing Documents and Settlement Agreements"). A note
accompanying the rule states that "Rule 41.1 was enacted to set forth with clarity the fact that the courts
of this State are presumed to be open and to set forth with particularity when documents and settlement
agreements, submitted to a court for approval, may be sealed." Id.
12. See discussion infra Part IV.
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III. THE "CHILLED SETTLEMENTS" ARGUMENT

A number of arguments for and against secrecy have been advanced in
legislative debates, in testimony at hearings, and in written comments to courts
contemplating rule amendments. The principal arguments are well-known, have
been analyzed in detail, and need not all be reiterated here, with the exception of
what might be called the "chilled settlements" argument. Professor Laurie Dor6 of
Drake Law School, a nationally recognized authority on court secrecy, has defined
the two sides of the chilled settlements argument as follows:
[C]onfidentiality proponents believe that restrictions on litigation
secrecy will significantly impede the settlement process and
unduly burden an already oversubscribed judicial system.
Public access advocates, in contrast, question how critical
confidentiality really is to the compromise of most cases when
trial represents a lengthy, expensive, and risky alternative.
...Many public access advocates doubt whether restricting
confidentiality would have any effect upon the frequency or
amount of settlement. 3
Those who contemplate using their authority to restrict the uses of secrecy
mechanisms in litigation must do so in a manner that is consistent with the policy
of promoting settlement of disputes--"a long-established public policy aimed at
preserving the autonomy of litigants to resolve their own disputes as they wish and
4
at conserving both public and private resources by avoiding trial." Professor Dor6
points out that that policy underlies Federal Rule of Evidence 408 and its analogues,
which hold evidence of a settlement or an offer to settle inadmissible in some
situations. She notes, however, that "[s]hifts in the American procedural landscape
and in our overall vision of civil litigation ...have called these rationales into
question and have suggested that, at least in some cases, party autonomy and the
preference for settlement should yield to some greater interest supporting public
access."' 5 The tension between the policies of maintaining open courts and records

13. See Laurie Kratky Dor6, Secrecy by Consent: The Use And Limits of Confidentiality in the
Pursuitof Settlement, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 283, 304-05 & n. 93 (1999) [hereinafter Secrecy by
Consent]; Laurie Kratky Dor6, The ConfidentialityDebateand the Push to Regulate Secrecy in Civil
Litigation (Roscoe Pound Institute, 2000) (paper presented to 2000 Roscoe Pound Institute Forum for
State Court Judges), available at http://www.roscoepound.org/new/00kratky.pdf (last visited Apr. 9,
2004); Laurie Kratky Dor6, The ConfidentialityDebate, TRIAL, Oct. 2000, at 18. Professor Dor6 has
described and analyzed the arguments on all sides of the secrecy question exhaustively and impartially.
The compendium of course materials for the 2000 Judges Forum, which includes a substantial
bibliography and a collection of secrecy-related measures adopted by various states (current as of
2000), is also available at http://www.atlanet.org/secrecy/data/mat-Sec.pdf(last visited Apr. 2, 2004).
14. Secrecy by Consent, supra note 13, at 286.
15. Id.
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and encouraging settlement can be seen in the decisions of a number of courts
considering requests for secrecy, which have acknowledged the pro-settlement
policy but have concluded that circumstances specific to the case can outweigh it. 16
Early in the debate on secrecy, the Product Liability Advisory Council
Foundation provided a grant to Professor Arthur Miller of Harvard Law School to
write a substantial law review article supporting the corporate litigation interest in
keeping secrecy liberally available. Throughout the article, Miller cites concerns

for litigants' privacy and confidentiality of business information, and urges reliance
on judicial discretion, not regulation via legislation or court rule.' 7 He also suggests
that restrictions on the use of secrecy mechanisms could interfere with the
settlement process, leaving already overburdened courts with additional cases to try:
[P]romoting increased public access to information by restricting
the discretion of the courts to protect confidential information is
ill-advised. These restrictions run counter to important procedural
trends designed to enhance judicial power to control discovery,
improve efficiency, and promote settlement in the hope of
reducing cost and delay.'

16. See, e.g., Pansy v. Borough of Stroudsburg, 23 F.3d 772, 788 (3d Cir. 1994) ("District courts
should not rely on the general interest in encouraging settlement, and should require a particularized
showing of the need for confidentiality in reaching a settlement.... Even when a particularized need
for confidentiality is put forth by the parties, the interest in furthering settlement should only be one
factor in the district court's determination."); Bank of America Nat'l Trust v. Hotel Rittenhouse
Assocs., 800 F.2d 339, 346 (3d Cir. 1986) ("Even if we were to assume that some settlements would
not be effectuated if their confidentiality was not assured, the generalized interest in encouraging
settlements does not rise to the level of interests that we have recognized may outweigh the public's
common law right ofaccess."); U.S. v. Ky. Utils. Co., 124 F.R.D. 146, 153 (E.D. Ky. 1989), rev "d,927
F.2d 252 (6th Cir. 1991) ("[S]ettlements will be entered into in most cases whether or not
confidentiality can be maintained. The parties might prefer to have confidentiality, but this does not
mean that they would not settle otherwise. For one thing, if the case goes to trial, even more is likely
to be disclosed than if the public has access to pretrial matters."); C.L. v. Edson, 409 N.W.2d 417,423
(Wis. Ct. App. 1987) ("[T]he parties contend that ... making these settlements public will have a
chilling effect on future litigants and will counteract the public interest in encouraging settlements.
These arguments are speculative. In addition, they are unpersuasive in light of the trial court's specific
remedy ....
The parties have failed to show that the public's interest in encouraging settlements
overcomes the strong presumption favoring disclosure of court documents."); cf.Wilson v. Am. Motors
Corp., 759 F.2d 1568, 1571 n.4 (11 th Cir. 1985) ("There is no question that courts should encourage
settlements. However, the payment of money to an injured party is simply not 'a compelling
governmental interest' legally recognizable or even entitled to consideration in deciding whether or not
to seal a record. We feel certain that many parties to lawsuits would be willing to bargain (with the
adverse party and the court) for the sealing of records after listening to or observing damaging
testimony and evidence. Such suppression of public records cannot be authorized.").
17. Arthur R. Miller, Confidentiality,Protective Orders,and Public Access to the Courts, 105
HARv. L. REv. 427 (1991). In his article, Professor Miller asserts (inaccurately) that ATLA organized
a nationwide campaign to induce courts and legislatures to ban many forms of secrecy and made such
a ban its highest priority. Id. at 441-45.
18. Id. at 431-32.
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...[W]hatever the value of disclosure, it should not obscure the
strong public interest in, and policy objectives furthered by,
promoting settlement. Settlement not only reduces the need for
further governmental involvement, but also reduces the cost of
dispute resolution to the litigants and helps free valuable judicial
resources and thereby promotes more efficient operation of the
courts. Our civil justice system could not bear the increased
burden that would accompany reducing the frequency of
settlement or delaying the stage in the litigation at which
settlement is achieved. 19

Professor Miller's article, and especially his "chilled settlements" argument,
immediately became a staple of the corporate side of the court secrecy debate. The
argument is routinely raised in testimony at hearings, in written comments on
proposed secrecy restrictions, and in news media interviews with pro-secrecy
advocates.2" An excellent recent example of its employment can be found in the
proceedings surrounding the principled initiative in the United States District Court
for the District of South Carolina to ban sealed settlements.
IV. FEDERAL JUDGES CONFRONT SECRET SETrLEMENTS

Chief District Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr. began the effort to take on secret
settlements in district court in 2002. As a New York Times reporter described it,
Judge Anderson was most concerned with the selling of secrecy
as a commodity, he said in an interview. He recalled being told
by a plaintiff's lawyer that the lawyer had obtained additional
money for his client in exchange for the promise of secrecy.
"That's what really lit my fuse," the judge said. "It meant that
secrecy was something bought and sold right under a judge's

19. Id. at 486 (footnotes omitted). A detailed critique of Professor Miller's article may be found
in David Luban, Settlements and the Erosionof the PublicRealm, 83 GEO. L.J. 2619, 2652-59 (1995).
20. See Diana Digges, ConfidentialSettlements UnderFire in 13 States, LAWS. WKLY. USA,
Apr. 30, 2001 at BI, availableat http://www.atlanet.org/secrecy/data/confid.pdf (last visited Apr. 2,
2004).
Defense attorneys... argue that the anti-secrecy bills would have a chilling
effect on settlements, making litigation both more common and more contentious
...The defense bar admits there's no hard evidence of a chilling effect, but they
insist it's a logical outcome if corporations feel "under siege." And, they say,
their clients are giving them an earful.
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21

Anderson began with a letter to his colleagues urging them to take collective action:
Here is a rare opportunity for our court to do the right thing ....
and take the lead nationally in a time when the Arthur
Andersen/Enron/Catholic priest controversies are undermining
public confidence in our institutions and causing a growing
suspicion of things that are kept secret by public bodies ....
Some of the early Firestone tire cases were settled with
court-ordered secrecy agreements that kept the Firestone tire
problem from coming to light until many years later ....
Arguably, some lives were lost because judges signed secrecy
agreements regarding Firestone tire problems.22
Under Judge Anderson's leadership, the ten active judges of the district settled
on a simple one-sentence rule that would ban outright the sealing of any settlement
agreement filed with the court. The judges solicited comments from the bar and the
23
public, and posted the comments on their public website.
An examination of the affiliations of the comment writers and the arguments
is instructive. The court received thirty-one letters.24 The writers of fourteen of the
letters stated that they supported the rule change; thirteen wrote that they opposed
it; and four expressed a preference for alternative approaches (other than the status
quo) that they considered likely to be more effective. The writers included the
court's advisory committee, which was asked to review the judges' draft proposal;
seven lawyers who mentioned no affiliation; three who wrote on behalf of plaintiffor consumer-oriented legal organizations; six who wrote on behalf of, or mentioned
affiliations with, defense-oriented legal organizations; three who wrote on behalf
of insurance organizations; six who are legal academics; and five who wrote for
nominally non-partisan legal organizations or for non-legal academic or
professional organizations. All six academics and the advisory committee favored
either the proposed amendment or an alternative method of restricting secrecy. All
three consumer-oriented legal organizations supported the rule amendment, while

21. Liptak, supra note 2.
22. Id.
23. The amendment added a new subsection (C) to the court's Local Rule 5.03 ("Filing

Documents under Seal"), providing that "[n]o settlement agreement filed with the court shall be sealed
pursuant to the terms of this Rule."
The comments are available in toto at http://www.scd.uscourts.gov/notices/COMLR503.pdf(last
visited Apr. 2, 2004) [hereinafter Record]. The document in which the comments are collected is 173
pages long. All pages cited in the following footnotes are to pages of the pdf document as a whole, not
to pages of individual letters.
24. For purposes of counting pro and con comments, two or more letters from the same person
or entity are treated as a single comment.
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all six defense-affiliated writers and all three insurance organizations opposed it.
Four letters to the court specifically cited Professor Miller's 1991 article."
Not surprisingly, all three insurance organizations and four of the lawyers
affiliated with defense organizations made the "chilled settlements" argument:
*

*

*

*

"

•

"[If the rule amendment is adopted] it will as a practical matter be
to counsel clients to compromise and settle disputed
more difficult
26
cases."
"[C]onfidentiality of settlements is often an important factor for
the plaintiff as well as the defendant in negotiating the settlement
of a case . . . . The absence of confidentiality would impede
settlement of some cases. 27
"Defendants will more likely submit to trial rather than settle
claims if settlement agreements could no longer be subject to a
protective order. This in turn would further burden already
28
overcrowded court dockets.
"Such a rule ... would also deter many settlements, which is
contrary to the interests of the parties, the courts, and the
public."29
"[B]y eliminating the continued use of confidential settlement
agreements, the Court... may also, in instances where an insured
has the power to reject a settlement, make the difference in
30
whether the case is settled or proceeds to trial."
"[T]he proposed rule would likely discourage parties from settling
litigation if the parties desire that the terms of the agreement

25. In addition to the published comments, the New York Times stated that "[o]pponents of the
proposal argue that secrecy encourages settlements, which they say are desirable given limited court
resources," and quoted Professor Miller as stating:
"The judges of South Carolina, God bless them, have not evaluated the costs of what they
are proposing," said Arthur Miller, a law professor at Harvard and an expert in civil
procedure. He said the ban on secret settlements would discourage people from filing suits

and settling them, and threaten personal privacy and trade secrets.
Liptak, supra note 2.
26. Record, supra note 23, at 32-33 (letter from David E. Dukes, Esq., a member of the Board
of Directors of the Defense Research Institute (July 24, 2002)).
27. Id. at 126-27 (letter from Henry B. Smythe, Jr., Esq. (July 24, 2002)) ("[A]s a member of
Products Liability Advisory Council .... I have also represented Firestone in the federal and state
courts of South Carolina for about twenty-five years.").
28. Id. at 96-97 (letter from Joyce E. Kraeger, Esq., writing for the Alliance of American Insurers
(Sept. 12, 2002)).
29. Id. at 112-13 (letter from Gregory LaCost, Esq., writing for the National Association of
Independent Insurers (Sept. 30, 2002)).
30. Id. at 172-73 (letter from J. Donal Tierney, writing for American International Companies
(Sept. 30, 2002)).
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The president of the South Carolina Defense Trial Attorneys' Association made the
broadest predictions of all:

*
*

"[T]he proposed amendment . . .may ultimately result in a
chilling effect on settlements of civil disputes."32
"[A]n elimination ofconfidential settlement agreements will serve
as a disincentive for settlement in a majority of civil cases."33

Four of the writers who supported restricting secrecy mentioned the "chilled
settlements" argument but rejected it outright or questioned its premise:
*

*

*

"Claims that secret settlement promote increased settlements is
[sic] speculative at best ....
If parties enter into secret settlements
to avoid publicity, these same parties will again seek to settle
cases to avoid the publicity surrounding a lengthy trial. This
'general interest in encouraging settlement' is not enough
to
overcome the presumption of openness."34
"Opponents of openness claim that cases wouldn't settle without
secrecy. There is no evidence for this proposition .... The
amount of settlement maybe lower, but only because no premium
is paid for silence.""
"I do not believe that secrecy provisions are make-or-break

31. Id. at 169-71 (letter from Daniel J. Popeo, General Counsel & Paul D. Kamenar, Senior
Executive Counsel, Washington Legal Foundation (Sept. 30, 2002)).
32. Record, supra note 23, at 89-91 (letter from H. Mills Gallivan, Esq., President, South
Carolina Defense Trial Attorneys Association (Sept. 26, 2002)).
33. Id. at 92-95 (letter from H. Mills Gallivan, Esq. (July 23, 2002)) (emphasis added). Stephen
Darling, Esq., Gallivan's successor as President of the South Carolina Defense Trial Attorneys'
Association, made the same assertion in the paper he submitted for the Secret Settlements Symposium
using Gallivan's language essentially verbatim. Stephen E. Darling, Confidential Settlements: The
Defense Perspective, 55 S.C. L. REv. 785, 787 (2004).
34. Record, supra note 23, at 38-50 (letter from Lucy Dalglish et al., on behalf of The Reporters
Committee for Freedom of the Press, the National Press Club, The Radio-Television News Directors
Association, and the Society of Professional Journalists (Sept. 27, 2002) (citations omitted)).
35. Id. at 51-64 (letter from Richard A. Zitrin, Director, Center for Applied Legal Ethics,
University of San Francisco School of Law (Sept. 26, 2002)). Zitrin is a prominent critic of secrecy in
litigation and has written widely about it. See, e.g., Richard A. Zitrin, The Case Against Secret
Settlements (Or, What You Don 't Know Can Hurt You), 2 J. INST. FOR STUDY LEGAL ETHICS 115
(1999) (urging adoption of an ethics rule against secret settlements). See also Richard A. Zitrin, What
Judges Can and Should Do About Secrecy in the Courts (Roscoe Pound Institute, 2000) (paper
presented to 2000 Roscoe Pound Institute Forum for State Court Judges, available at
http://www.roscoepound.org/new/00zitrin.pdf (last visited Apr. 2, 2004)); Richard A. Zitrin,
Overcoming Secrecy with JudicialPower,TRIAL, Nov. 2000 at 74 ("Arguments about the privacy of
disputes should generally be outweighed by the public's right to know.").

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol55/iss4/10

10

20041

Rooks: Settlements and Secrets: Is the Sunshine Chilly
SETTLEMENTS AND SECRETS: IS THE SUNSHINE CHILLY?
settlement components. Cases that can settle will settle without

them. I say this because I know from experience what happens
when defendants come sniffing around, requesting what are, in
essence compounding agreements. When told to go fly a kite they
36
always come back with the money and settle anyhow."
"Can anyone demonstrate factually that, in states with limits on
secrecy in litigation, the settlement rate per capita has decreased
significantly since the limits were implemented? ... Can anyone

demonstrate factually that, in states with limits on secrecy in
litigation, the trial rate per capita has increased significantly since
the limits were implemented?"37
In the end, the judges of the District of South Carolina adopted their onesentence rule. They were evidently unswayed by the dire predictions of chilled
settlements. Judge Anderson had expressed his doubts about the threat of chilled
settlements early on:
Judge Anderson told his colleagues that their court, at least,

had available capacity. He wrote that the court had disposed of
3,856 civil cases in the previous 12 months, which included only
35 cases tried to a verdict.
"If the rule change I propose were enacted and it did result in
two or three more jury trials per judge per year (which is far from
we could handle the
certain)," Judge Anderson wrote, "I think
38

increased workload with little problem.,

36. Record, supra note 23, at 132-38 (letter from Professor John P. Freeman, University of South
Carolina School of Law (July 11, 2002)). Professor Freeman made an interesting argument that some
secret settlements involve conduct that is criminal to some degree. Id. at 133. Such settlements may
constitute "compounding" agreements-agreements to conceal or not to prosecute conduct which is
criminal, thereby "compounding" the criminal offense. South Carolina and a number of other states
make compounding a discrete criminal offense. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-9-370 (Law. Co-op. 1976)
("Taking money or reward to compound or conceal offense") (making such conduct a Class C
misdemeanor, punishable by not more than one year imprisonment).
Secret settlements that fit the definition of compounding are, Professor Freeman argued, illegal
and unenforceable, and by analogy, many agreements that would conceal material matters of public
safety are against public policy and are similarly unenforceable. Record, supra note 23, at 135-36.
Thus, he asserted, the often-cited rule that the plaintiff is entitled to accept any settlement offered is
limited. Id. at 137. A plaintiff is not entitled to accept a settlement that includes an agreement to keep
illegal conduct secret, thus "compounding" the offense. Id. at 137-38. See also John Freeman, The
Ethics of Using Judges to Conceal Wrongdoing, 55 S.C. L. REV. 829 (2004).
37. Record, supra note 23, at 14-20 (letter from Mary E. Alexander, J.D., M.P.H., President,
Association of Trial Lawyers of America (Sept. 24, 2002)).
38. Liptak, supra note 2. Judge Anderson's case-counting discussion exposes a logical flaw in
the chilled settlement argument that goes to the significance of a denial of a secrecy request: even a
wholesale failure of settlement in the presumably small number of cases in which secrecy is sought but
denied cannot logically lead to a large number of extra trials. Indeed, Professor Miller intimated that
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Despite the fervor of the corporate-side arguments that "sunshine" provisions
adopted by courts and legislatures to restrict secrecy will chill settlements, some
evidence is emerging from publicly collected and maintained court statistics that
undercuts claims that restrictions on secrecy discourage settlement. The evidence
can make no claim to scientific rigor, but it strongly suggests that the "chilledsettlements" argument is a red herring used to stem the trend toward greater judicial
scrutiny of secrecy requests. One state, Florida, offers an opportunity to test the
"chilled-settlement" hypothesis against the actual experience of the courts.
In 1990 the Florida legislature passed the state's Sunshine in Litigation Act,
requiring courts to scrutinize the subject matter of secrecy requests for any hidden
"public hazards."39' If a change in Florida's regime for handling requests for secrecy
would undermine the policy of encouraging settlement, increase the workload of the
courts and deprive litigants of resolution of their cases short of trial, that impact
should be observable after twelve years ifreliable data on case filings and
resolutions exist. Fortunately, the State of Florida collects, audits, and publishes
detailed caseload data for its trial courts.
A look at the statistics collected by the Florida courts through their Summary
Reporting System (SRS) suggests several trends that are relevant to the secrecy
issue. The trends are observable in Charts A-E, which display filing and
disposition data for tort cases 40 per 1,000 residents 4' of Florida, along with general

the number of secrecy orders granted is small. See Miller, supra note 17, at 442 n.69 (citing John F.
Rooney, Issue of Sealed Files, Secrecy in the Courts Won't Be Swept Underthe Rug, CHI. DAILY L.
BuLL., Apr. 20, 1991, at I (reporting thatjudges feel that comparatively few sealing orders are issued)).
39. Sunshine in Litigation Act, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 69.081 (West 1987 & Supp. 2004) (prohibiting
the concealment ofpublic hazards). For an analysis of how the statute works, see Ray Shaw, Sunshine
in Litigation, 74 FLA. B. J. 63 (2000).
40. Raw data are provided for tort filings in Table I and for tort dispositions in Table 2. See App.
C. The office of the State Courts Administrator provided the data on filing and dispositions from the
Florida Supreme Court's Summary Reporting System (SRS) in March 2003. The data is on file with
the author. The SRS was developed by the Florida Supreme Court to provide a uniform means of
reporting categories of cases, time required in the disposition of cases, and the manner of disposition
of cases. The most recent data are available online at the Florida Courts Internet site:
http://www.flcourts.org/pubinfo/highprofile/DelphiFullReport.pdf (last visited Apr. 2, 2004).
Needless to say, this data does not include cases that are settled without ever being filed in a court,
or cases subjected to arbitration or other alternative dispute resolution mechanisms. However, cases
filed in court are the only matters to which court-sanctioned secrecy can apply, and whose failure to
settle could conceivably increase court caseloads.
41. The per capita calculation is used to correct for changes in population and to put increases
in the raw number of tort cases in perspective. For instance, an increase in case filings by 20% over a
given period of time might be considered significant by observers. However, if the population of the
jurisdiction increases by 25% in the same time period, the rate of case filings is actually declining.
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tort litigation and population data.42
Chart A shows the gross trend in Florida per capita tort filings and dispositions
from July 1987 through June 2000.4' Although the numbers for each year vary, they
reflect a clear downward trend beginning well before the enactment of Florida's
Sunshine in Litigation Act in 1990 and extending into 2000. Per capita filings
declined substantially, from 2.76 per 1,000 residents to 2.23. Dispositions exceeded
filings in some years and not in others, but were always close to the number of
filings, and show a similar trend from 3.01 to 2.16 per 1,000 residents. (These data
also refute dramatically the arguments that a "litigation explosion" in Florida
necessitated the adoption of broad tort "reform" measures by the Florida legislature
in 1999. 4)
Of course, per capita case filings were higher for some types of litigation than
for others, and the incidence of requests for secrecy are also likely to vary by subject
matter, depending on the stakes involved. Charts B through E show the comparable
relationships for each of the four case categories used by the SRS to calculate the
"All Torts" data in Chart A.45 Chart B shows the trends in filings (1.61 to 1.09) and
dispositions (1.80 to 1.16) for auto negligence cases, which closely track the trends
in All Torts. 46 In Chart C, "Other Negligence," both trends are flatter (0.93 to 0.79
for filings, 1.07 to 0.79 for dispositions), but both are still noticeably downward.
The trends in Chart D, Professional Malpractice, are flatter still (0.15 to 0.14 for
filings, 0.08 to 0.11 for dispositions).47 In Chart E, the per capita rates for products
liability cases fluctuated more over the fourteen-year period represented than did
those for the other categories.48 Still, product liability cases accounted for only
6.25% of all tort filings over the entire period.4 9
Florida's Sunshine in Litigation Act has been in effect for nearly thirteen years,
and there is reason to believe that trial lawyers for both sides have simply accepted
it and moved on with business."0

42. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE U.S., availableat www.census.gov/
prod/200 Ipubs/statab/secO1 .pdf (last visited Apr. 2,2004) (reporting the estimated Florida population
on July 1st each year). Florida population data for 1987-2000 is provided in App. C, Table 3.
43. The SRS data from Florida trial courts include four tort categories: professional malpractice,
products liability, auto negligence, and "other negligence." When added together, the data should
include substantially all tort cases filed and disposed of in a given year. The sums of the four categories
are shown in Chart A as "All Torts." See App. B.
44. 1999 Fla. Laws ch. 99-225. For an analysis of the weak justification for the Florida omnibus
tort "reform" statute provided by its proponents, see Robert S. Peck et al., Tort Reform 1999: A
Building Without a Foundation, 27 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 397 (2000).
45. See App. B.
46. See App. B.
47. See App. B.
48. See App. B.
49. The calculation is shown on Table 4. See App. C.
50. See Shaw, supra note 39, at 63 (observing that "[e]ither Florida's Sunshine in Litigation
Statute... is not widely known, or it is so clear in its intent and meaning that the courts never get much
of an opportunity to interpret it"). See also Dan Christensen, FederalJudges [in Florida]Ponder
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VI. WHERE ARE THE CHILLED SETTLEMENTS?

Lawyers who support courts and judicial records that are open to the public, and
want to keep them that way, need to move beyond hypotheses and partial court
statistics to assist policymakers in future decisions on whether to restrict the use of
secrecy in the courts. The bar needs to ask-and get answers to-a very
straightforward question: Where are the settlements that have been "chilled" by
restrictionson secrecy? Who knows of a case in which a settlement was offered
on condition of the execution of a secrecy agreement of one sort or another, but was
withdrawn when either a party or the court rejected the secrecy?
I believe there are far too few such cases to justify maintaining the widespread
use of secrecy in court proceedings. Increasingly, lawyers who oppose secret
settlements have found opportunities to test this theory directly with judges and
practitioners:
Both in his letter to the federal judges in South Carolina and in his
paper for this Symposium, Richard Zitrin, who directs the Center
for Applied Legal Ethics at the University of San Francisco
School of Law, wrote, "At three judicial seminars at which I have
been privileged to speak on this subject... I did not find a single
judge who believed cases would not settle."'"
I had a similar opportunity for inquiry on January 31, 2003, while
observing an educational program for the Hawaii judiciary
presented by the Roscoe Pound Institute. The audience included
over fifty of the state's seventy-odd judges. After hearing a
presentation by Professor Dor6 and comments by several lawyers
and judges, 2 I asked the assembled judges if they could recall
even one case in which a defendant requested secrecy but either
the plaintiff or the court rejected the request, and as a result of that
denial, the case had to go to trial. No judge in the audience

Future of Secret Settlements, MIAMI DAILY Bus. REV., Sept. 12, 2002 (quoting Larry Stewart, a
prominent Florida litigator and a former president of ATLA, that he has heard of no settlements that
were not achieved because of the effect of Florida's law: "This is not a big deal anymore."). Cf Digges,
supra note 20:
Even some defense attorneys are a bit philosophical about the trend. "Whether
you're talking about corporate and executive earnings or information derived
from lawsuits, we are a much more open society today," says [Texas Association
of Defense Counsel president Tom) Bishop. "And in all candor, what happens is
that after a law or regulation is in effect for a period of time, people just start
dealing with it."
51. Richard A. Zitrin, Why the Laudable South CarolinaCourt Rules Must be Broadened, 55
S.C. L. REv. 883,899 (2004).
52. Among the panelists for the Hawaii program were Chief Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr. of the
United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, and H. Mills Gallivan, President of the
South Carolina Defense Trial Attorneys Association.
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(which represented hundreds of years of judicial experience)
acknowledged having seen even one such case.
I had a similar opportunity for inquiry on July 21, 2003, while
speaking at a Continuing Legal Education (CLE) session at the
annual convention of the Association of Trial Lawyers of
America. The audience consisted of about eighty lawyers of
varying degrees of experience. I asked for a show of hands of
everyone who had "ever been offered a settlement that was
conditioned on agreeing to secrecy." Approximately seventy
hands were raised. I then asked those who had accepted the
settlement to lower their hands, but those who had rejected it to
keep their hands up. About twenty hands remained up. I then
asked, "if you were able to settle the case anyway, please put your
hand down. If you couldn't settle it without secrecy and had to go
to trial, please keep your hand up." Four lawyers (about 5%of the
audience) kept their hands up. Because of time constraints, there
was no opportunity to inquire further about any other factors that
might have played a role in keeping the case from settling.
During the panel discussion at the end of this Symposium,
Stephen G. Morrison, Esq., a defense lawyer in Columbia, South
Carolina, and a former president of both the South Carolina
Defense Trial Attorneys Association and the national Defense
Research Institute, observed that rejections of secrecy demands
tied to settlements were increasing. When that happened, he
stated, defense lawyers might handle the case differently, for
instance paying less compensation in settlement or taking the case
to trial. At the question-and-answer session following the panel
discussion, I asked him if he had personally handled any cases in
which secrecy demands were rejected, and if so, if he had
He
eventually settled the cases despite the rejection.
acknowledged that he had such cases and that he eventually
settled them.
Probably the most valuable source of all on this question, at least
as it applies to South Carolina, is Judge Anderson. In his Article
for this Symposium, Judge Anderson stated that case statistics for
his court, "compiled since the implementation of Local Rule
5.03(c) easilyrefute" the argument that restrictions on secrecy will
be a deterrent to settlements.53 Judges in his court, he wrote, tried
two fewer cases in the year following implementation of Local
Rule 5.03(c) than they had in the previous twelve months, and

53. Joseph F. Anderson Jr., Hidden from the Public by Orderof the Court: The Case Against
Government Enforced Secrecy, 55 S.C. L. REV. 711, 726 (2004).
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new case filings, far from being discouraged (as argued by
Professor Miller 4), had increased by 384 cases over the preceding
year. 55 Judge Anderson also cited a particularly complex case
over which he presided in which he was asked to approve a
settlement and order the parties not to disclose its terms. He
stated that he "declined and the case settled in any event."56

I ask any attorney or judge who knows of a case in which settlement was
"chilled" to contact me with details of the litigation.5 7 For obvious reasons,
responses from defense-side trial lawyers are welcome, and especially important.58
This is the opportunity for lawyers of goodwill from both the plaintiff and defense
bar to communicate and resolve this interesting but obstructive question.
VII.

FROM SPECULATION TO SOPHISTRY

The lawyers and tort "reform" publicists who have made the "chilled

settlements" argument for over a dozen years have cited no empirical evidence to
support it, and the empirical evidence that does exist appears to contradict it. I
claim that the "chilled settlements" shibboleth is, at bottom, a make-weight
argument intended to frighten judges away from restricting secrecy in their courts
by appealing to legitimate concerns over caseloads.
In the early 1990s, when the movement to restrict secrecy began and courts
were beginning to reconsider the routine granting of secrecy requests, no evidence
existed of what would happen in the courts when they did so. The "chilled
settlements" argument was essentially a prediction, and had some plausibility. As
such, it could be neither proved nor disproved, either by its proponents or its
opponents. However, the argument has been used now for over twelve years in
attacking sunshine proposals. For the same period of time, at least a few courts

54. Miller, supra note 17, at 431-32.
55. Anderson, supra note 53, at 726.

56. Id. at 718 (citations omitted).
57. I posed the same question when an earlier version of this Article was published in TRIAL
magazine in June 2003. That issue of TRIAL was mailed to over 54,000 addresses. To date I have heard
from no lawyer or other reader with information about the kind of case I define.

Responses should be written. I will need, at a minimum, the name and telephone number of an
attorney orjudge involved in the case who will be willing to provide additional information such as the
case caption, the court in which it was filed, the docket number, and the date of the last court action.

I can be reached by email atjim.rooks@cclfirm.com, or by mail at Center for Constitutional Litigation,
P.C., 1050 - 31st Street, N.W., Washington DC 20007.
58. These examples will, to be sure, constitute "anecdotal" evidence of the validity vel non of the
"chilled settlements" argument. However, federal court rulemakers in recent years have taken note of

anecdotal evidence of various litigation phenomena when considering changes to court rules. And,
anecdotal evidence produced as a result of this invitation will differ from the anecdotal evidence offered
by tort "reform" advocates in that it will include all verifiable anecdotes reported, no matter what their
impact on the hypothesis.
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have operated under the very regime opposed by business interests. Thus, the
"chilled settlements" argument is no longer a mere prediction. It is, impliedly, a
statement about both the past and the present. As the years have passed, it has
become clearer that there has never been a solid basis for it, if any. In this sense,
the "chilled settlements" argument is consistent with numerous other arguments that
continue to be made by business entities in support of tort "reform" measures of one
sort or another.5 9
Given the hallmark presumption that American courts are open to the public,
and the conclusion of several courts that the policy of encouraging settlements is not
the end of discussion but is rather one element to consider, it is fair to place the
burden of proof of the "chilled settlements" argument on the opponents of sunshine.
The corporate side knows whether sunshine measures have chilled settlements,
because such agreements are their settlements. After more than a decade of
argument and observation of numerous antisecrecy measures adopted by court
systems and state legislatures, the defense side and its clients have yet to satisfy
their burden of proof. I do not believe they ever will.

59. Two of the country's preeminent social scientists studying jury verdicts wrote the following
about tort "reform" rhetoric related to the jury:
Underlying [the tort reformers'] promise for legal reform are the familiar refrains

of a litigation explosion, a lawsuit crisis, a liability crisis, an insurance crisis,
skyrocketing jury awards, unscrupulous lawyers, and on, and on. This legal

system run amok is blamed for everything from the unavailability of essential
health care and medicines, the loss of business competitiveness in the world

economy and the concomitant effects on economic well-being and jobs, to the
closing of public parks and the demise of high school football. These costs and

others are presented as ajustification for immediate, fundamental reform in the
civil justice system.
We are skeptical of the efficacy of many proposed and enacted reforms, and we
are concerned about the consequences of those measures. Beyond the self-interest
of those groups lobbying for reform, we can see little reason for endorsing this
reform agenda. We come to this position after spending a number of years
collecting and analyzing data on civil jury verdicts from different parts of the
country. We-and others-do not find empirical evidence of a system run amok
with skyrocketing awards, and so on. Or, we find little or no empirical
information available regarding many of the claims made by the reformers about
juries and the civil justice system.
STEPHEN DANIELS & JOANNEMARTIN, CIVILJURIES ANDTHE POuTICS OF REFORM ix-x (Northwestern

University Press 1995).
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ASSOCIATION OF TRIAL LAWYERS OF AMERICA
BOARD OF GOVERNORS
MAY 6,1989
TAMPA, FLORIDA

RESOLUTION ON PROTECTIVE ORDERS
WHEREAS, currentjudicial interpretation often deviates prejudicially from the
mandate ofthe established Rule FRCP 26(c) impeding an efficient,just, and speedy
resolution of disputes; and,
WHEREAS, defendants in personal injury actions, as a condition to discovery
or settlement, often demand the execution of an agreement ("Secrecy Agreement")
or the entrance of an order ("Secrecy Order") which includes provisions, inter alia,
(i) prohibiting the dissemination of discovery materials; (ii) precluding the
disclosure of the contents of pleadings, motions and discovery requests; (iii)
forbidding any communication concerning the terms of the ultimate resolution of
a claim; (iv) enjoining plaintiff s counsel's participation in other similar cases; (v)
insisting on the return and/or destruction not only of discovery materials but
counsel's personal notes; and,
WHEREAS, Secrecy Agreements and Secrecy Orders which ignore the interest
of individual victims, the courts and the pubic have harmful effects including: (i)
they make it difficult if not impossible for plaintiff's counsel to fairly and properly
prepare the victim's case; (ii) they guarantee an unfair advantage to defense counsel
who retain full access to their collaborative mechanism; (iii) they inject collateral
issues totally unrelated to the merits of the case; (iv) they greatly increase the time,
effort and transactional costs associated with the preparation and presentation of a
civil action; (v) they diminish the likelihood that the civil justice system will operate
so as to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action; (vi)
they encourage the suppression and destruction of relevant documents by
unscrupulous defendants and other discovery materials; (vii) they have a chilling
effect on the right of persons to resort to the courts for redress of their grievances;
and,
WHEREAS, the strong policy favoring openness in discovery, and public
access to the materials which affect the decisions and the conduct of the civil justice
system is based on recognition that the free flow of information is vital to the safety,
health and general welfare of the public and to exposing unsafe products and
activities for investigation and to the proper operation ofthe civil justice system, the
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol55/iss4/10
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governmental regulatory system, and the professional disciplinary system;
NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED that The Association of Trial
Lawyers of America:
1) Encourages courts to refuse to enter any Secrecy Order and/or refuse to
enforce any Secrecy Agreement in the absence of a finding based on a good cause
showing supported by a particularized proof of the following: (a) that the proponent
of the Agreement or Order possesses a cognizable legal interest entitled to the
protection of secrecy; (b) that the subject materials meet the rigorous legal criteria
applicable to the trade secrets or privileged information or otherwise justify the
court in exercising its judicial power to restrict the openness of discovery or public
access to information; (c) that disclosure of the materials is, in fact, likely to result
in a clearly defined and very serious harm.
2) Encourages courts in those rare instances in which a good cause showing
supported by particularized proof would seem to justify the entrance of a Secrecy
Order, to insist on the adoption of and the enforcement of such specific terms as are
necessary and appropriate to protect such competing interests as the public's right
to know, the rights of claimants involved in other similar actions, the public's
concern for judicial economy, including: (a) provision for limited disclosure to
counsel representing plaintiffs in similar cases, to government agencies or to
professional disciplinary bodies who agree to be bound by appropriate agreements
or court orders against broader dissemination; (b) stringent safeguards surrounding
any ordered return or destruction of documents to ensure that full and accurate
copies of all documents will be available to the appropriate agencies or to other
litigants in the future; (c) stringent safeguards that no Secrecy Agreement or
Secrecy Order should prohibit an attorney from representing any other claimant in
a similar action against the defendant or others; (d) stringent safeguards to the effect
that no Secrecy Agreement or Secrecy Order should prohibit reporting to a
governmental agency those facts reasonably necessary to prevent injuries to others.
3) Encourages courts to look favorably on and/or to freely grant petitions for
modification which seek relief from Secrecy Agreements and/or Secrecy Orders
which were entered into or obtained by a procedure which did not conform to the
criteria stated in Resolution (1) above and/or which do not contain provisions
similar to those contained in Resolution (2) above.
4) Discourages attorneys from agreeing to Secrecy Agreements and
encourages attorneys to resist entry of Secrecy Orders that prevent disclosure of
documents obtained during discovery to fellow attorneys handling similar cases, or
to public agencies charged with enforcing safety.
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Chart A
Florida: All Torts

Solid bars are case filings; cross-hatched bars are dispositions.

Chart B
Florida: Auto Negligence
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Chart C
Florida: Other Negligence
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Chart D
Florida: Professional Malpractice
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Chart E
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APPENDIX C

TABLE 1: TORT CASES FILED IN FLORIDA CIRCUIT COURTS
Year

Professional
Malpractice

Products
Liability

Auto
Negligence

Other
Negligence

Totals =
"All Torts"

1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000

1768
1615
1380
1400
1452
1579
1652
1828
1873
1931
1916
2098
2248
2166

906
1045
856
952
1263
2577
2300
2332
4507
2526
2614
2435
3556
3468

19285
19232
20277
19851
20527
20555
19107
19112
19991
20625
20799
20243
18793
17362

11168
11061
11057
11942
11408
11864
11750
12601
12494
12828
12611
12720
13137
12610

33127
32953
33570
34145
34650
36575
34809
35873
38865
37910
37940
37496
37734
35606

TABLE 2: TORT CASES CONCLUDED IN FLORIDA CIRCUIT COURTS
Year

Professional
Malpractice

Products
Liability

Auto
Negligence

Other
Negligence

Totals =
"All Torts"

1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000

906
1398
1495
1495
1405
1380
1467
1491
1631
1767
1796
1836
1889
1790

770
813
815
756
950
2384
913
768
971
1103
1492
1123
2290
1584

21580
18915
19395
20669
20364
21074
19553
18713
18852
18218
19431
19518
20054
18581

12803
12701
11614
11883
11630
11729
11196
11483
11778
11892
12399
12268
12576
12600

36059
33827
33319
34803
34349
36567
33129
32455
33232
32980
35118
34745
36809
34555
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TABLE 3: FLORIDA POPULATION
YEAR

POPULATION

1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000

11,997,000
12,306,000
12,638,000
12,938,000
13,289,000
13,505,000
13,714,000
13,962,000
14,185,000
14,427,000
14,683,000
14,908,000
15,111,000
15,982,000

NOTE: Population figures represent the Florida population on July 1 of each year,
as published in the Statistical Abstract of the United States, published by the U.S.
Census Bureau, www.census.gov/ prod/www/statistical-abstract-us.html.

TABLE 4: FILED PRODUCTS CASES AS PERCENTAGE
OF ALL TORT CASES FILED

YEAR
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
TOTALS

PRODUCTS
CASES FILED

ALL TORT
CASES FILED

906
1045
856
952
1263
2577
2300
2332
4507
2526
2614
2435
3556
3468

33127
32953
33570
34145
34650
36575
34809
35873
38865
37910
37940
37496
37734
35606

31337

501253

(Products Filings / All Filings = 31337 / 501253 = 0.0625173 = 6.25 percent)
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